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Examining price and service competition among retailers in a supply chain under 
potential demand disruption 
 
Abstract 
     Supply chain disruptions management has attracted significant attention among 
researchers and practitioners. The paper aims to examine the effect of potential market 
demand disruptions on price and service level for competing retailers. To investigate the 
effect of potential demand disruptions, we consider both a centralized and a decentralized 
supply chain structure. To analyze the decentralized supply chain, the Manufacturing 
Stackelberg (MS) game theoretical approach was undertaken. The analytical results were 
tested using several numerical analyses. It was shown that price and service level investment 
decisions are significantly influenced by demand disruptions to retail markets. For example, 
decentralized decision makers tend to lower wholesale and retail prices under potential 
demand disruptions, whereas a proactive retailer needs to increase service level with an 
increased level of possible disruptions. This research may aid managers to analyze 
disruptions prone market and to make appropriate decision for price and service level. The 
manufacturer or the retailers will also be able to better determine when to close a market 
based on the proposed analysis by considering anticipated disruptions. The benefits and 
usefulness of the proposed approach are explained through a real-life case adopted from a toy 
supply chain in Bangladesh.  
Keywords: Disruption management; price competition; service competition, demand 
disruptions, supply chain risk.   
1. Introduction 
      Firms face ever-increasing competition at the local and international level in sustainably 
conducting business at a profit (Cardinali & Bellini, 2014; Kuo 2013;  Fornari, Fornari, 
Grandi, & Menegatti, 2016). Within this dynamic and competitive environment, non-price 
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factors such as after sales service, free gifts are equally if not more important than price 
factors, irrespective of whether the environment in question exists in a developed or 
developing countries, firms may struggle in operating business smoothly (Kumar et al., 2017; 
Murali, Pugazhendhi, & Muralidharan, 2016; Sarkar, Kundu, & Chaudhuri, 2016). Many 
people have had the real life experience of getting a different quality of service from two 
retail stores, although they may be adjacent to each other. Also, the same product can be 
obtained at a different price from different retail stores. Driven by this practical life 
experience, this research focuses on interactions between retailers related to product price and 
customer service. Interested readers are directed to read Lu et al. 2011;  Li et al. 2012; Tsay & 
Agrawal 2004 to gain further insight into service attributes in decision making in supply 
chains.  
      Supply chain success largely depends on the consumption of products from downstream 
supply chain agents, i.e., retailers. Customer loyalty is greatly influenced by retail price and 
retail services, which ultimately assists firms in building a strong brand image on top of 
product quality (Yuen & Chan 2010). As such, fixing the price of products and providing 
demand-enhancing service, as well as ensuring exemplary after sales service, are considered 
to be  key strategic and tactical decisions (Lu et al. 2011). Moreover, recent supply chain 
literature emphasizes the inclusion of disruption risk, supply chain risk and uncertainty in 
strategic decision making (Paul et al. 2016a; 2016b; 2017; Ali & Nakade 2016). Otherwise, 
supply chain managers may be prone to decision making under the assumption of smooth 
business environment (Tang 2007). 
      A number of articles have examined the issues of price competition (Anderson & Bao 
2010; Yang et al. 2014; Opornsawad et al. 2013; Roy, Sana, & Chaudhuri, 2015 ; Wang 2006; 
Wang & Sun 2011; Willart, 2015), or focused on formulating analytical models to deal with 
price sensitive demand (Sana, 2011a; 2011b; 2012). However, few papers simultaneously 
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consider price and service competition issues. Table 1 gives a recent scenario of price and 
service competition issues. When dealing with service competition, most studies assume that 
manufacturers are competing to provide demand-enhancing services and that they are 
investing in offering services (Zhao et al. 2013). It might therefore be worth exploring when 
retailers are competing to provide services to customers, as well as how they are bearing the 
cost involved in providing the services to customers. This paper investigates such insights 
from the theoretical and practical standpoint.  
Table 1: Research considering price and service competition issues 





1 Farm (2016) Price  √ 
2 Gabaix et al.(2016) Price  √ 
3 He et al. (2015) Price √  
4 Dan et al.  (2014) Price and service  √ 
5 Giri & Maiti (2014) Service  √ 
6 Mahmoodi & Eshghi  (2014) Price  √ 
7 Wenlong et al. (2013) Price √  
8 Li et al. (2012) Price and Service  √ 
9 Lin et al. (2011) Price  √ 
10 Lowengart & Mizrahi (2001) Price  √ 
 
      Disruptions caused by natural and man-made actions introduce shocks into the supply 
chain systems, and can paralyze the supply chain (Schmitt et al. 2017). In this work, we 
attempt to examine price and service decisions under a state of probabilistic demand 
disruption. Much of the research in the literature on demand disruptions is based on 
coordination and contracts among supply chain partners. However, there remains a dearth of 




      Demand disruption can occur due to loss of major customers, innovative competitors and 
inaccurate forecasting (Koblen & Škůrková 2015). It is obvious and needless to say that 
demand is the key driver for proper functioning of the supply chain. Therefore, demand 
disruption significantly influences all agents in the chain (Huang et al. 2006; Wenlong et al. 
2013; Xiao & Yu 2006). Eventually, the original production, purchasing, pricing, and 
marketing plans must be revised in order to respond to or compensate for the demand 
disruption.  
      Cao et al. (2013) proposed a supply chain coordination mechanism with a single 
manufacturer and numerous retailers by utilizing revenue sharing agreements. Xiao et al. 
(2007)  considered different scenarios to mitigate demand disruptions by considering quantity 
discounts. Xiao & Qi (2008) developed the coordination mechanism and the effect of cost on 
this and considered quantity discount schemes.  
      To the best of our knowledge, price and service competition issues with potential demand 
disruption are rarely reported in the literature. In addition, it is evident from the literature that 
little attention is paid to numerical investigations of the product prices and service levels of 
firms while taking demand disruption into consideration. It may be meaningful to study 
optimal firm decisions on price and service level investments with consideration for 
probabilistic demand disruption. This paper aims to fill this research gap in the literature of 
supply chain risk management. 
      Markets are becoming more vulnerable due to an increase in the number of man-made 
and natural disruptions (Peck 2006). Therefore, research focusing on price and service 
competition with disruption may benefit decision makers responsible for pricing and fixing 




 We explore the pricing and service mechanisms of multiple competing retailers 
under both decentralized and centralized supply chain configurations while 
considering potential demand disruptions at the retail market. 
 Unlike most of supply chain literature, which focuses on building conceptual 
frameworks (Tang & Musa 2011), or applies supply chain coordination 
mechanisms (Chen & Xiao 2009; Xiao et al. 2005), we conduct a numerical 
investigation to inspect price and service level decisions of the supply chain 
members in the context of the market to provide management insights into the 
problem.  
 We examine the effect of probability of disruptions on retail demand markets and 
investigate the extent and pattern of changing the price and service of a supply 
chain system with regard to disruptions probability.      
      The remaining sections of this paper are organized as follows.  Section 2 presents 
materials and methods relevant to this research. Section 3 briefly gives the competing 
retailers model. In Section 4, we provide the solution methodology for fixing price and 
service level in centralized and decentralized supply chains. Section 5 applies the proposed 
method to a case supply chain in Bangladesh, and the results are illustrated therein. Finally, 
Section 6 concludes the research with theoretical and managerial implications.  
 
2. Materials and methods 
2.1 Supply chain risk  
      A supply chain network is comprised of organizations, people, technology, activities, and 
information. Its function is to add value to raw materials and components, and transforms 
them into final products for delivery to end users (Hishamuddin 2013). Thus, the activities 
performed in a supply chain play a major role in achieving competitive advantage for the 
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stakeholders in the network.  
      Supply chain risk is classified into operational risk and disruption risk (Tang 2006, 
Wakolbinger & Cruz 2011, Cruz 2013, Kleindorfer & Saad 2009). Fig. 1 displays supply 
chain risk categorization based on the probability of risky events and the impact of such 
events on business.  
 
Fig.1: Categorization of supply chain risk (Brindley, 2017) 
       Operational risks refer to the risks faced by an organization during normal operations due 
to the uncertainties of demand, supply, market price, and cost (Heckmann et al., 2015). Table 
2 lists some operational risks in supply chains. 
      Supply chain disruptions can be thought of as catastrophic events (Knemeyer et al. 2009) 
that can severely degrade supply chain performance (Hoffmann et al. 2013). Supply chain 
networks are exposed to numerous unpredictable and unforeseen disruptions (Atwater et al. 
2014; Blackhurst et al. 2011). Supply chain disruptions can be caused by either natural 
environment disasters and uncertainties, or by human acts including political instability, 
quality problems, regional turbulence, and terrorism (Hishamuddin 2013; Ambulkar et al. 
2015a; Cao et al. 2013).  
      Supply chain disruption may reduce the performance of supply chains drastically. For 
instance, the supply chain disruptions faced by organizations around the globe during the 
Taiwan earthquake of September 1999 severely impacted the global semiconductor market 
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(Papadakis & Ziemba 2001). Ericsson lost $400 million in sales in the year 2000, and had to 
quit the mobile phone business when fire seized the Phillips microchip plant in New Mexico, 
one of the major suppliers to Ericsson (Tomlin 2006). 
Table 2: Categories of operational risks in supply chains 
Operational risk  Brief description Literature 
Capacity The risk related to low/high capacity of a 
plant. This risk also includes a lack of 
capacity flexibility. 
Qin et al. (2014).  
Demand Risk involved in demand fluctuations or 
demand uncertainty. The causes may involve 
inaccurate demand forecasting or other man-
made or natural factors, which are external to 
an organization.  
Paul et al. (2014a).  
Information Information leaked or hacked, cyber-attacks 
on supply chain players important 
information 
Bandyopadhyay et al. (2010) .  
Inventory Risk resulting from too high or too low 
inventory level, damage to inventory. 
Guéant et al. (2013). 
 
Lead time Risk from the variability of lead time in 
manufacturing, sourcing and delivery of 
products. 
  Lin (2016). 
Price Risks from raw materials, finished goods ad 
auxiliary and operating materials. 
Kaufmann (2016).  
Supply  Risk resulting from inbound supply failure or 
supply delay, or in the absence of a multi-
sourcing strategy. 
Lee (2015).  
Transportation Transportation failure, delay in 
transportation, high transportation cost.  
Hishamuddin et al. (2015). 
      Today’s supply chain management is continuously focusing on increasing the efficiency 
of supply chain network (Atwater et al. 2014) and is having shorter lead times, less suppliers,  
reduced inventories, and greater globalization (Jabbarzadeh et al. 2016). These developments 
have resulted in leaner and cost-effective supply chains (Neiger et al. 2009; Craighead et al. 
2007). However, supply chains have consequently become much more exposed to risks 
(Natarajarathinam et al. 2009). 
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2.2 Supply chain disruptions management 
      Norrman & Jansson (2004) defined supply chain risk management as the ability to have 
associates in a supply chain and to “apply risk management process tools to deal with risks 
and uncertainties caused by, or impacting on, logistics related activities or resources” (p. 
436).  
      The concept of managing supply chain risk is an established concept (Ho et al. 2015). In 
fact, where there is a supply chain, whether it is operating at the local (Rogers et al. 2016; 
Elzarka 2013) or global level (Tse et al. 2016; Cruz 2013; Oehmen et al. 2009), there are 
inherent risks. In order to remain competitive in a vulnerable environment, supply chains 
need to be examined to mitigate against potential risks. Thus, numerous researchers have 
recently pursued supply chain risk management research (Aqlan & Lam 2015; Srivastava et 
al. 2015; Singhal & Singhal 2012; Samvedi et al. 2013; Tang & Musa 2011).  
      There are two approaches, seen in both the academic literature and in practice, to 
mitigating supply chain disruptions; the proactive approach and the reactive approach 
(Natarajarathinam et al. 2009). Table 3 gives an overview of proactive and reactive 
approaches employed in the recent literature to mitigate the effect of supply chain 
disruptions.  
Table 3: Proactive and reactive approaches to disruption management 
Sl. no. Authors Approach used Domain of application 
1 Chung et al. (2015) Proactive approach Express logistics supported by  
air transportation. 
2 Marley et al. (2014) Reactive approach Steel processing plants. 
3 Schmitt et al. (2016) Reactive approach Four-echelon supply chain 
including assembly. 
4 Sawik (2016) Proactive-reactive Supplier selection with a focus on 
disruption management. 
5 Tse et al. (2016) Proactive approach Thai beverage industry. 
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      Disruptions are uncertain as they are probabilistic in nature (Wenlong et al. 2013). Retail 
markets may be analyzed and predicted accordingly by considering the uncertainty associated 
with disruptions. Reactive strategies need time to recover from disruption and delayed 
response to disruptions can cause severe financial and reputational harm to firms, such as in 
the case of Philips/Ericsson. Therefore, proactive strategy may be beneficial to firms in 
achieving their goals (Norrman & Jansson 2004).  
2.3 Supply chains with centralization and decentralization  
      Maximizing total supply chain profit is the goal of the centralized supply chain (Jonsson 
et al. 2013). The integration of different stages of supply chain is maximized in a CSC 
because information redundancy is minimized. The underlying concept of centralization is 
the ability to receive, maintain and complete all processes, and thus maximize the profit of 
the whole supply chain system.   
      In a centralized setting, the profits of all the retailers and manufacturers are cumulative. 
Suppose 𝜋𝑖 is the profit for retailer i,  𝜋𝑚 is the manufacturer's profit, and 𝜋𝑠𝑐 is the profit of 
the total supply chain . Thus, we have  
 
𝜋𝑠𝑐 = ∑ 𝜋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜋𝑚           (1) 
                                                                                           
    Under decentralized settings, each participant of the supply chain seeks to capitalize their 
own interest and profit, and there is competition rather than cooperation among the supply 
chain members (Ali & Nakade 2016). Game theory is often used for the optimization of 
decentralized supply chains (Lu et al. 2012). Competitiveness among the manufacturers and 
retailers can be solved using the Nash Equilibrium (Nagurney et al. 2015; Chen et al. 2017), 
while collaborations among supply chain partners are seen as difficult in Stackelberg games 
(Basar, 2010).  
      In the game theory approach, the comparative power of bargaining controlled by each 
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firm is based on its leader-follower relationship to the other firms in the supply chain. The 
firm holding more power for bargaining is termed as Stackelberg leader, who has more 
competitive advantage. A firm with less power typically responds to leader’s resolutions. For 
instance, in the MS game (Liu et al. 2016, Lu et al. 2011), manufacturers determine 
wholesale prices. The retailers notice the decisions made by the manufacturer and reply to 
those decisions by selecting retail prices. In the RS game (Lu et al. 2011), decision orders are 




Fig. 2a: Manufacturer Stackelberg                          Fig. 2b:  Retailer Stackelberg 
      This paper studies and applies the Manufacturing Stackelberg game where the 
manufacturer has leader role and the retailer has follower role. The leader wants to maximize 
their profit with the information provided by the followers’ response function. We can solve 
the problem by following the method of ‘backward induction’. The manufacturer solves the 
retailer’s reaction function basing the fact that the retailers already know the wholesale price. 
From a specified wholesale price, 𝑤𝑖
∗, the retailers choose their retail price, 𝑝𝑖
∗, and service 
level, 𝑠𝑖
∗, in order to have their equilibrium profit maximized. Assuming that all the retailers 
move simultaneously in a market. Therefore, we have the following conditions: 
w𝑖∗ 𝑝𝑖∗ , 𝑠𝑖∗   
Retailer (Follower) 
 Retail price 
 Service level 
Manufacturer (Leader) 
 Wholesale price 
Manufacturer (Follower) 
 Wholesale price 
Retailer (Leader) 
 Retail price 
 Service level 




∗ ∈ 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑝𝑖𝜋𝑖(𝑝𝑖, 𝑝𝑗
∗|𝑤𝑖, 𝑤𝑗)        (2) 
𝑠𝑖
∗ ∈ 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑠𝑖𝜋𝑖(𝑠𝑖, 𝑠𝑗
∗|𝑤𝑖, 𝑤𝑗)        (3) 
Solving the above two conditions gives 𝑝𝑖, 𝑝𝑗,𝑠𝑖, 𝑠𝑗. From the reaction functions of the 
retailers, the manufacturer chooses their wholesale price using the following relationship: 
𝑤𝑖
∗ ∈ 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑤𝑖𝜋𝑚(𝑤𝑖, 𝑤𝑗
∗|𝑝𝑖, 𝑝𝑗, 𝑠𝑖 , 𝑠𝑗)       (4) 
Vertical Nash theory means consumers receive more service in the case where every supply 
chain member possess an equal proportion of the total bargaining power.  
3. Competing retailer’s model 
     The competing retailer’s model for a supply chain consisted of one supplier 𝑀 and many 
retailers, N, is 𝑅1≤𝑖≤𝑁,  is shown in Figure 3. The supplier, 𝑆, charges retailer, 𝑅𝑖, a wholesale 
price, 𝑤𝑖 for the product. Each retailer, 𝑅𝑖, chooses their retail price, 𝑝𝑖,, and service level, si. 
The demand, 𝐷𝑖  depends on the price vector, p = p1, p2, … , pN, i ≠ j,  and service level 
vector, s = s1, s2, … , sN, i ≠ j. The demand function is assumed to depend on price and 
demand stimulates the  required service level. The demand function for each supply chain 
member is linear in self-price, cross-price, self-service and competitors` service levels, but 
has heterogeneous parameters for all of the retailers, Ri, under consideration. In addition, 
market demand functions for each retailer are increasing in competitors' price and self-service 
level and decreasing in self-price and competitors` service level. This type of linear demand 
functions including similar assumptions are widely reported in the economics and supply 
chain literature. Interested readers are directed to the works of  Lu et al. (2011); Hua et al. 




Fig. 3: Competing retailers model 
 
      Without loss of generality, and for the purpose of facilitating ease of computations of the 
studied model, we study a supply chain composed of two retailers and one manufacturer. 
Thus, we have the following demand function:  
𝐷𝑖 𝑝𝑖,𝑝𝑗,𝑠𝑖,𝑠𝑗 = 𝛼𝑖 − 𝛽𝑖𝑃𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖𝑃𝑗 + 𝛿𝑖𝑠𝑖 − 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑗, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗      (5) 
Here, 𝛽𝑖, and   𝛾𝑖  represent the self- and cross-price elasticity of demand, respectively; 𝛿𝑖 
measures market demand responsiveness to i
th
 retailer`s service level; and 𝜃𝑖 is the intensity 
of competition in terms of service provision to their customers. 𝛽𝑖, 𝛾𝑖, 𝛿𝑖, 𝜃𝑖 > 0 and 𝛽𝑖 >  𝛾𝑖, 
𝛿𝑖 > 𝜃𝑖 for ∀i. If 𝑘 denotes the marginal cost required to attain the service level 𝑠, then the 




  (Lu et al. 2011; Tsay & Agrawal 
2004). Diminishing returns appears to occur naturally if the service includes a substantial 
inventory level component. According to Tsay & Agrawal (2000),  "under the assumption of 
standard inventory models, moving from 97% to 99% fill rate typically requires a greater 
incremental investment than does moving from 95% to 97%. For other concepts of service, 
we presume that a rational manager will always target the `lowest hanging fruit`, so that 
subsequent improvements are progressively more difficult"  (P. 375).  
      Using the demand function, and with the inclusion of the service cost, we have the 
following profit functions for the retailers in a supply chain system:  






















 (𝑝𝑁 , 𝑠𝑁)  
 (𝑝𝑖, 𝑠𝑖)  
 (𝑝2, 𝑠2)  
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      (6)                                              
The manufacturer profit function is given by: 




      = ∑ ((𝑤𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖)𝛼𝑖 − 𝛽𝑖𝑃𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖𝑃𝑗 + 𝛿𝑖𝑠𝑖 − 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑗)
𝑁
𝑖=1,𝑖≠𝑗      (7)  
 In addition, the total supply chain profit will be: 
𝜋𝑠𝑐 = 𝜋𝑖 + 𝜋𝑚, 




 𝑁𝑖=1 + ∑ ((𝑤𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖)𝐷𝑖) 
𝑁
𝑖=1      (8)                                                                                               
 
 4. Setting optimal price and service level investment under demand disruptions 
      Pricing and service strategies are formulated for the two retailers while emphasizing 
demand disruptions. The probability of demand disruption for i
th
 retail market is denoted by 
i  here. Moreover, when a disruption happens in the retail market, it stimulates changes in 
the market scale αi for i = 1,2. αi indicates the maximum possible demand when the products 
in question are offered free of charge. Management determines αi based on demand 
forecasting. In this study, the effect of disruptions is captured by ∆αi. Thus, the new market 
scale in the event of disruptions is αi = αi + ∆αi. The change of demand ∆αi can be 
characterized as deterministic (Wenlong et al. 2013; Xiao & Qi 2008) or stochastic (Xiao & 
Choi 2010). The demand functions after disruptions are therefore:   
?̅?1 = (𝛼1 + ∆α1) − 𝛽1𝑃1 + 𝛾1𝑃2 + 𝛿1𝑠1 − 𝜃1𝑠2        (9) 
?̅?2 = (𝛼2 + ∆α2) − 𝛽2𝑃2 + 𝛾2𝑃1 + 𝛿2𝑠2 − 𝜃2𝑠1       (10) 
4.1 A decentralized supply chain environment with demand disruption 
     For a decentralized supply chain, every supply partner wants to have their own profit 
maximized. Considering potential demand disruptions, the manufacturer’s and retailer’s 
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profit can be given by:  
?̅?𝑚 = ∑ [(𝑤𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖)?̅?𝑖𝜑𝑖 + (𝑤𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖)𝐷𝑖1 − 𝜑𝑖]
2
𝑖=1,𝑗=3−𝑖      (11) 
  𝑖 = 1,2 and 𝑗 = 3 − 𝑖 
Further: 




   (12)                       
     We now apply the MS game theoretical approach (See sub-section 3.1) to derive retail 
price, retail service and wholesale price under non-disrupted conditions. The detailed 
methodology of the MS game can be found in Yang et al. (2015); Yang & Zhou (2006); and 
Yu et al. (2009). 
 
 4.2 A centralized supply chain with demand disruption 
     In a centralized supply chain, we are fascinated in maximizing the total supply chain profit 
Thus we have:  







𝑖=1              (13) 
Differentiating with 𝑃𝑖  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠𝑖 and then putting them equal to zero gives:  
∂?̅?𝑠𝑐
∂pi
= 0 = 𝜑𝑖(𝛼𝑖 + ∆α𝑖 − 𝛽𝑖𝑝𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖𝑝𝑗 + 𝛿𝑖𝑠𝑖 − 𝑠𝑗𝜃𝑖) − (𝜑𝑖 − 1)(𝛼𝑖 − 𝛽𝑖𝑝𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖𝑝𝑗 + 𝛿𝑖𝑠𝑖 −
𝑠𝑗𝜃𝑖) − 𝛽𝑖(𝑐𝑖 − 𝑝𝑖)(𝜑𝑖 − 1) + 𝛾𝑗(𝑐𝑗 − 𝑝𝑗)(𝜑𝑗 − 1) + 𝛽𝑖𝜑𝑖(𝑐𝑖 − 𝑝𝑖) − 𝛾𝑗𝜑𝑗(𝑐𝑗 − 𝑝𝑗) 
              (14) 
∂?̅?𝑠𝑐
∂si
= 0 = 𝛿𝑖(𝑐𝑖 − 𝑝𝑖)( 𝜑𝑖 − 1) − 𝑘𝑠1 − 𝜃𝑗(𝑐𝑗 − 𝑝𝑗)(𝜑𝑗 − 1) − 𝛿𝑖𝜑𝑖(𝑐𝑖 − 𝑝𝑖) +
𝜑𝑗𝜃𝑗(𝑐𝑗 − 𝑝𝑗)            (15) 
      Solving these two equations yields the price levels 𝑝1, 𝑝2 and service levels 𝑠1, 𝑠2 for the 
decentralized supply chain case. Note that the second order conditions and the negative 
definite Hessian matrix must be checked to determine the optimal solution.  For further 
details, readers are referred to Lu et al. (2011). 
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5. Application of the proposed approach 
     We deliberate the results obtained from the application of the proposed approach to a 
representative supply chain in Bangladesh. We consider a toy supply chain, which comprises 
one manufacturer and two retailers, for this purpose. For convenience, we include the 
scenario with 𝛼1 = 𝛼2 = 20, and demand disruption magnitude 𝛻𝛼1 = 𝛻𝛼2 = −3. In 
analyzing competitive behavior among retailers, similar simplifying assumptions are shown 
in the literature (e.g., Yang & Zhou 2006). 
      We first numerically compute wholesale price, retail price, retail service level and optimal 
profit for both the centralized and decentralized settings with and without in a state of 
demand disruptions. We use deterministic demand disruption values in the present work. 
Table 4 represents the obtained results under various supply chain parameters. To simplify 
the experiment, we assume some parameter values to be equal. The values of those 
parameters are c1 = 𝑐2 = 1, 𝛽1 = 𝛽2 = 1,  𝛾1 = 𝛾2 = 0.6, 𝛿1 = 𝛿2 = 1, 𝜃1 = 𝜃2 = 0.7, 
𝜑1 = 𝜑2 = 0.20. Assuming identical parameters can enhance the comparison of the decision 
variables, and enable managerial insights (Zhao & Wei 2012).  We assume the service cost 
coefficient 𝑘 = 0.8. It is noted that, under such assumed symmetrical conditions, the decision 
parameters become equal  (Opornsawad et al. 2013) i.e., w1 = 𝑤2, p1 = p2 and s1 = s2. 
Therefore, the wholesale and retail prices and retail services are included only once in Table 
4. It is also worth mentioning that the solutions obtained are the Nash equilibrium wholesale 
and retail prices and retail services in a decentralized setting under the MS scenario. 
Conversely, for a centralized setting, the retail prices and retail services imply optimal prices 
and services that maximize total profit of the whole supply chain.  
      Table 4 presents the reduction of profit observed when comparing normal and fluctuating 
demand conditions. The supply chain maximizes profit when the players are engaged in a 
centralized environment with no disruptions, whereas a significant drop in profit is evident in 
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every alternative scenario. It can be observed that the profit decreases by 7.91% when 
disruptions occur into the centralized supply chain. Similarly, the manufacturer`s and the 
retailers' profit are decreased by 6.02 and 6.10 %, respectively, when the supply chain 
experiences demand disruptions. These findings reflect the significance disruptions as well as 
the need for revision of pre-disruption decision variables in the supply chain planning 
process. The benefit and usefulness of revising pre-disruption supply chain decisions are 
described by Paul et al. (2015a; 2015b; 2014b).  
 
Table 4: Wholesale and retail price, retail service and optimal profit for several supply chain 
attributes 
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  In this part of the study, we are interested in exploring how potential demand disruptions 
influence supply chain decisions from the viewpoint of a proactive decision-making 
environment in a supply chain system. We, therefore, present numerical investigations 
considering different combinations of probability of demand disruptions under both 
centralized and decentralized supply chain scenarios. Assuming that the probability of 
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demand disruptions, 𝜑1 is varied from 0 to 1, and 𝜑2 = 0.1. Since we consider symmetric 
data, it is sufficient to examine the nature and pattern of the decision variables under demand 
fluctuations by varying the disruptions probability for only the first retailer.  
 
 
Fig. 4: The wholesale and retail price for Retailer 1 
     Figure 4 shows that in the decentralized setting, the supplier and the retailer who suffers 
demand disruptions all tend to lower the wholesale and retail prices, which are proportional 
to the probability of demand disruptions. This observation aligns with the findings of 
Wenlong et al. (2013). When the demand for the retail market drops, the retailer associated 
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Fig. 5: The service level for Retailer 1 
      Figure 5 shows that, when Retailer 1 lowers their service level to compensate for the 
severity of increased disruptions, Retailer 2 tends to increase their service level. As both of 
the retailers are competing to be able to provide higher service levels, the retailers are 
prompted to increase the service level in order to hold more customers in the market.  
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     Figure 6 shows that the profit for the centralized setting and for the players in the 
decentralized setting tends to decrease with increasing disruptions. Moreover, the profits of 
the centralized system seem to be higher than those of the decentralized configuration of the 
chain, even in the case of demand disruptions. Whether or not a supply chain undergoes 
disruptions, the centralized supply chain setting produces more profit or becomes more 
efficient than the corresponding decentralized supply chain, as shown in the supply chain 
literature ( e.g., Ali & Nakade 2016). 
6. Conclusions, implications, and recommendations for future research 
     Research focusing on price and service related issues is an expanding research stream in 
the economics and supply chain literature, as well as in commercial business practice. In a 
disrupted supply chain environment, the significance of and requirements for pricing and 
servicing strategy are assorted and increasingly demanding.  
      This paper presents a numerical examination of the effect of demand disruption on pricing 
and service strategies of the supply chain under both centralized and decentralized supply 
chain scenarios. In the numerical calculations, we considered different demand disruption 
probabilities, and examined the behavior of the model in terms of pricing, service, and profit 
of the supply chain members. The analysis revealed that the original pricing and servicing 
strategy needs to be adjusted to mitigate the effect of demand disruptions.  
      This work provides a basis for further study in the area of supply chain disruptions. From 
an academic perspective, this work uniquely contributes to the literature by recognizing the 
revision of price and service level investment by retailers in response to disruptions. Most of 
the previous studies considered one-manufacturer-one-retailer supply chains when focusing 
on price and service level decisions. In fact, most of the studies concentrated on price factor 
only when dealing with issues related to competition (Wenlong et al. 2013; Xiao & Qi 2008). 
This research has first developed a model that numerically examine price and service level 
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decisions based on a Manufacturing Stackelberg game theory approach. In addition, this 
studies relaxes the assumption, used in previous studies  (e.g., Lu et al. 2011; Zhao et al. 
2013), that manufacturers in competition with one another bear the costs of demand 
stimulated service levels. Our research diverts this cost to retailers in competitions in contrast 
to  Lu et al. (2011) and Zhao & Wei (2012).  
      Managers need to respond quickly to mitigate the effect of disruptions, including natural, 
man-made and financial disasters (Chowdhury & Quaddus 2015; Liu & Nagurney 2011; Kim 
& Park 2014). This research can help managers answer two questions: 1. how do we fix 
prices in a competitive environment with disruption? 2. What amount should be invested in 
non-price factors, such as offering better service to the customer, door-to-door maintenance 
and developing good relationships with customers in anticipation of market disruptions? 
From a centralized and decentralized supply chain perspective, this paper answers these 
questions. Decision makers can use this research as a guide to assist them to formulate 
response measures to disruptions, including price and service level decisions. This research 
analyzes both customers and markets that suffer frequent demand disruptions. Therefore, our 
results may inform retail markets in Japan, Indonesia, and Bangladesh, where disruptions due 
to natural and man-made disaster are common (Chiu & Small 2016; Siddiqi 2015; Mills et al. 
2011; Tweed & Walker 2011). 
      The research presented here could be extended in the following direction within the scope 
of disruptions management research: 
 Methodological extension: This study examined the competitive behavior among 
retailers by employing only the Manufacturing Stackelberg parameters.  Retailer 
Stacklelberg and Vertical Nash (Zhang et al. 2015) could also be tested under similar 
experimental conditions.  
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 Inclusion of multiple retailers: Real-life supply chains consist of multiple retailers. 
The research will be more appealing to supply chain practitioners if it includes multi-
retailer supply chains or multi-echelon supply chains (Pal et al. 2012; 2014). 
However, it is a major challenge to be able to incorporate the computational 
complexity that would arise under such settings.  
 Comparison of results with other competitive behaviors: Apart from Stackelberg 
theory, there are two others competitive behaviors, namely Cournot and Collusion 
(Yang & Zhou 2006).  These two competitive behaviors could be examined, and the 
results could be compared under similar settings. 
      The research proposed here could possibly be applied to any industrial domain to explore 
disruption prone markets and to optimize the price and service level investment decisions of 
supply chain players. The research also provides a foundation for academics to further 
investigate and extend the research in this field. 
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